Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 8

Number 2

Article 8

12-31-2015

South Africa - Trusts and the Patrimonial Consequences of
Divorce: Recent Developments in South Africa
François du Toit

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
François du Toit, South Africa - Trusts and the Patrimonial Consequences of Divorce: Recent
Developments in South Africa, 8 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol8/iss2/8

This Civil Law in the World is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

TRUSTS AND THE PATRIMONIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
DIVORCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
François du Toit
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 655
II. An Overview of South African Matrimonial Property Regimes
and Aspects of the Patrimonial Consequences of the Dissolution
of Marriages ........................................................................... 660
III. “Going Behind the Trust Form:” A Synopsis ....................... 665
IV. South African Judgments on Claims Regarding Trust Assets in
Divorce Proceedings .............................................................. 669
A. Claims for the Redistribution of Assets ............................. 669
B. Accrual Claims ................................................................... 678
C. Trust Assets and Joint Estates ............................................ 692
V. Concluding Remarks .............................................................. 698

I. INTRODUCTION
The South African trust is best described as an “evolutionary
hybrid”—a product of the coalescence of Roman-Dutch civil law
and English common law in South Africa’s mixed legal system.1
The South African trust, like its Anglo-American counterparts, is
essentially an administrative device through which a trustee
controls property for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.2
However, the South African trust, unlike its Anglo-American
 University of the Western Cape, Faculty of Law (South Africa); LL.B.,
LL.M., LL.D., University of Stellenbosch (South Africa). I am grateful to Profs.
Marius de Waal (University of Stellenbosch) and Bradley Smith (University of
the Free State) for their valuable commentary on an earlier draft of the article.
1. A description proffered by Tony Honoré, Trust in SOUTHERN CROSS:
CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 849, 850 (R. Zimmermann &
D. Visser eds., 1996).
2. Braun v. Blann and Botha NNO and Another 1984 (2) SA 850 (A)
859H.
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counterparts, is not premised on any dichotomy of ownership. This
is because the law/equity-divide in English law and its incidental
duality of legal and equitable ownership are foreign to South
African law’s adherence, in typical civilian fashion, to singular (or
unitary) ownership.3 Instead, the separation of estates (or
patrimonies)4 is fundamental to the conceptualization of the South
African trust—a trust constitutes a special estate, distinct from but
held contemporaneously with, the trustee’s personal (or general)
estate.5 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the
separateness of a trust estate in Land and Agricultural Bank of
South Africa v. Parker and Others6 when it described a trust estate
as an accumulation of assets and liabilities which vests as a
separate entity, devoid of legal personality, in trustees.7 The Court
confirmed, furthermore, that the “core idea” of the South African
trust lies in a functional separation between trustees’ control over
the trust property on the one hand, and trust beneficiaries’
enjoyment of the benefits yielded by that control on the other
hand.8 The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 is the statute that
regulates aspects of South African trust law. Section 12 of the Act
reinforces the separateness of a trust estate through its directive
that trust property forms no part of a trustee’s personal estate
except in the instance where a trustee is also a trust beneficiary and
has, as such, a claim to the trust property.
The foregoing synopsis explains why, where one of the spouses
in divorce proceedings is the trustee of a trust, the trust assets are,
3. Id. at 859F.
4. The term “estate,” rather than “patrimony,” is generally used in South
African legal parlance.
5. Marius J. de Waal, The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the
English, Scottish and South African Trusts Compared, 117 S. AFRICAN L.J. 548,
559–63 (2000). See also generally George L. Gretton, Trusts without Equity, 49
INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 599, 608–15 (2000).
6. Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005
(2) SA 77 (SCA). The Supreme Court of Appeal is South Africa’s highest court
in non-constitutional matters.
7. Id. at para. 10.
8. Id. at para. 19.
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in principle, excluded from the determination of the patrimonial
consequences of that divorce. The patrimonial consequences of the
divorce impact on the divorcing spouses’ personal estates, or, in
the case of a marriage in community of property, on the spouses’
joint estate. Where one spouse is the trustee of a trust, such a trust
constitutes a separate estate in that spouse’s hands and,
consequently, the trust property forms no part of the trusteespouse’s personal estate or, in the case of community of property,
the spouses’ joint estate. However, this ostensibly straightforward
legal position has been increasingly challenged before South
African courts since the advent of the twenty-first century. These
challenges occurred particularly in the context of the emergence of
a “newer type of trust”9 in South Africa since the 1990s. The
Supreme Court of Appeal described this newer type of trust in
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker, its seminal
judgment on point, as one under which the trust’s abovementioned
core idea is debased because the trust form is employed not to
separate trust beneficiaries’ beneficial interest from trustees’
control over trust property, but rather to permit everything to
remain “as before.”10 This occurs typically when a trust’s trustees
are also among the beneficiaries of that trust or, stated differently,
when some of the trust beneficiaries control the selfsame trust as
its trustees. In South Africa this newer type of trust is particularly
prevalent in the family context when, for example, a husband sets
up a trust with himself as trustee; and himself, his wife and their
children as trust beneficiaries. The husband then administers the
trust as if the trust property still formed part of his personal estate,
and does so (by reason of the family dynamics at play)
unchallenged by his family members who are the other
beneficiaries of the trust.

9. A term first used by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nieuwoudt and
Another NNO v. Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para. 17.
10. Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 26.
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A popular appellation in South African legal parlance for this
newer type of trust is the so-called “alter ego trust”11—it portrays
accurately the scenario in which a trustee controls the trust affairs
with self-interest and with an utter disregard for the existence of
the trust as a separate estate in which the trust beneficiaries are
beneficially interested: the trust is nothing but the trustee’s (in the
foregoing example, the husband’s) alter ego. The Supreme Court
of Appeal opined in the Parker case that, in order to remedy
trustees’ abuse of the trust through treating it as their alter ego and,
in so doing, debasing the core idea of the trust, it is, in appropriate
circumstances, permissible to find that “the trust form is a veneer
that in justice should be pierced” in the interests of, for example,
creditors.12 South African trust law has accepted “piercing the trust
veneer” and its synonym “going behind the trust form” 13 as
suitable descriptions for those instances where the courts provide
apposite relief when the trust form has been abused through
trustees’ non-observance of the core idea of the trust. In light of the
foregoing legal development, it was, predictably, only a matter of
time before a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego
through a disregard for the aforementioned control/enjoyment
divide that typifies the South African trust would, when such a
trustee engaged in divorce proceedings, elicit the averment from
his or her spouse that the trust property should be considered
alongside the property in the trustee-spouse’s personal estate, or
the property in the spouses’ joint estate, for the purpose of
determining the patrimonial consequences of the dissolution of
their marriage.

11. Commissioner for Inland Revenue v. Pick ’n Pay Employee Share
Purchase Trust 1992 (4) SA 39 (A) 59F was one of the first reported judgments
in which a court used the expression. Senior v. Senior 1999 (4) SA 955 (W)
964H was one of the first divorce cases in which the term was used.
12. Parker, 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3.
13. See, e.g., Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4)
SA 452 (WCC), para. 22.
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This article analyzes some of the principal South African
judgments on point in order to place in perspective the South
African courts’ engagement with alter ego trusts in divorce cases.
It is shown that, in particular, marriages concluded out of
community of property have given rise to claims that trust assets
should be considered alongside the property in trustee-spouses’
personal estates for the purpose of determining the patrimonial
consequences of the dissolution of such marriages. These claims
have been directed at either the addition of trust asset values to that
of trustee-spouses’ personal estates for the purpose of effecting
redistributions of assets (in terms of Section 7 of the Divorce Act
70 of 1979) on the one hand, and the inclusion of trust asset values
in the calculation of the growth of trustee-spouses’ personal estates
stante matrimonio for the purpose of realizing accrual claims (in
terms of Section 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984) on
the other hand. Marriages concluded in community of property
recently entered the fray when the South African Supreme Court of
Appeal had to adjudicate on a prayer that trust assets be considered
alongside the assets in divorcing spouses’ joint estate in order to
effect the division of that estate. Part IV of the article is devoted to
an analysis and evaluation of South African judgments on the
(possible) interplay between trust law and matrimonial property
law toward determining the patrimonial consequences of the
dissolution of marriages through divorce. That investigation is
preceded in Parts II and III of the article by brief contextualizing
descriptions of South African matrimonial property systems and
pertinent aspects of the patrimonial consequences of the
dissolution of marriages, as well as essential aspects of South
African courts’ power to go behind the trust form.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
REGIMES AND ASPECTS OF THE PATRIMONIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGES
Universal community of property is South Africa’s primary (or
default) matrimonial property system14—upon conclusion of the
marriage the spouses become tied co-owners in undivided and
indivisible half-shares of all the assets and liabilities they have at
the time of the marriage, as well as all the assets and liabilities they
acquire during the subsistence of their marriage. Upon the
dissolution of the marriage, all liabilities are settled from the joint
estate and the balance of the joint estate is thereafter distributed
equally between the spouses.15
Spouses are (and have always been) free to depart from this
default position by entering into a pre-nuptial contract. They may,
therefore, opt to marry out of community of property with the
exclusion of community of profit and loss—this is essentially a
regime of complete separation of property.16 However, this regime
is potentially prejudicial to the spouse who is in the weaker
financial position—typically the spouse who is not the family’s
primary breadwinner. Such a spouse, despite having contributed
financially and/or otherwise to the growth of the other spouse’s
estate, invariably finds him- or herself in an unfavorable position
upon the dissolution of the marriage by reason of limited or no
growth in his or her own estate during the subsistence of the
marriage. Such a spouse has no entitlement to a share of the other
spouse’s estate and, consequently, often finds him- or herself in a
financial predicament upon the dissolution of the marriage.17 The
Matrimonial Property Act, which commenced on November 1,
1984, introduced measures to address this situation. These will be
discussed in greater detail below. Even before the commencement
14. D.S.P. CRONJÉ & JACQUELINE HEATON, SOUTH AFRICAN FAMILY LAW
65 (3rd ed., LexisNexis, Durban 2010).
15. Du Plessis v. Pienaar NO and Others 2003 (1) SA 671 (SCA), para. 1.
16. CRONJÉ & HEATON, supra note 14, at 65.
17. Id. at 93.
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of the Matrimonial Property Act, spouses could combat the
aforementioned potentially adverse financial consequences of a
marriage subject to a complete separation of property by
concluding a marriage out of community of property with the
retention of community of profit and loss. This regime entailed that
all profits and losses stante matrimonio constituted a joint estate of
which each spouse owned an undivided half-share. However,
spouses hardly exercised this option in the past.18
The Matrimonial Property Act retained both of the
aforementioned formats of the marriage out of community of
property but, in an attempt to address the potential financial
prejudice consequent upon this regime, introduced the accrual
system in 1984. The Act stipulates that the accrual system applies
to all marriages concluded out of community of property and
community of profit and loss after the commencement of the Act,
unless this system is expressly excluded in the spouses’ pre-nuptial
contract.19
The accrual system entails that each spouse controls his or her
own estate during the subsistence of their marriage, but upon
dissolution of the marriage, spouses share in the accrual, or
growth, that their respective estates have shown during the course
of the marriage. Such sharing is effected by entitling the spouse
whose estate showed the smaller (or no) accrual during the
subsistence of the marriage to a claim against the spouse whose
estate showed the greater accrual stante matrimonio. This claim is
for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accruals
of the spouses’ respective estates.20 The accrual of an estate is the
amount by which the net value of a spouse’s estate at the
dissolution of the marriage exceeds the net value of that spouse’s
estate at the commencement of that marriage.21
18. Id. at 92.
19. Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, § 2.
20. Id. at § 3(1).
21. Id. at § 4(1)(a). If the net final value of a spouse’s estate is lower than
the commencement value, no accrual has occurred in respect of that spouse’s

662

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

The example hereafter illustrates the operation of the accrual
system.
Spouse A commenced the marriage with an estate valued at ZAR 200,000.
Spouse B commenced the marriage with an estate valued at ZAR 20,000.
Spouse A’s estate is valued at ZAR 1 million upon the termination of the marriage
through divorce.
Spouse B’s estate is valued at ZAR 100,000 upon the termination of the marriage through
divorce.
Had the spouses been married subject to a complete separation of property, Spouse A
would exit the marriage with ZAR 1 million and Spouse B would exit the marriage with
ZAR 100,000.
However, if the spouses married out of community of property but subject to the accrual
system, Spouse B (the spouse whose estate accrued the least during the subsistence of the
marriage) will have a claim against Spouse A upon the termination of the marriage
through divorce.
The extent of Spouse B’s claim is calculated as follows:
Accrual of Spouse A’s estate: ZAR 1 million (final value) – ZAR 200,000
(commencement value) = ZAR 800,000.
Accrual of Spouse B’s estate: ZAR 100,000 (final value) – ZAR 20,000 (commencement
value) = ZAR 80,000.
The difference between the respective accruals: ZAR 800,000 (Spouse A’s accrual) –
ZAR 80,000 (Spouse B’s accrual) = ZAR 720,000.
Half of the difference between the respective accruals: ZAR 720,000 ÷ 2 = ZAR 360,000.
Spouse B will, therefore, have a claim against Spouse A for ZAR 360,000.
Consequently, Spouse B will exit the marriage with ZAR 460,000 (ZAR 100,000 (Spouse
B’s estate value) + ZAR 360,000 (Spouse B’s accrual claim)) and Spouse A will exit the
marriage with ZAR 640,000 (ZAR 1 million (Spouse A’s estate value) – ZAR 360,000
(Spouse B’s accrual claim)).

The above example underscores the more equitable financial
dispensation occasioned by the accrual system for the spouse who
finds him- or herself in the financially weaker position upon the
dissolution of the marriage. However, the Matrimonial Property

estate. For the purpose of the final calculation, that spouse’s “accrual” is
regarded as being zero: H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND
AND WIFE 305 (5th ed., Juta & Co., Ltd. 1985).
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Act did not introduce the accrual system retroactively;
consequently, a spouse to a marriage concluded subject to a
complete separation of property that was entered into prior to the
commencement of the Act may still find him- or herself in a
precarious financial position if that marriage was to be dissolved
by divorce today. In order to alleviate such potential prejudice,
Section 7 of the Divorce Act permits one spouse (typically the
spouse in the financially weaker position) to request a so-called
“redistribution of assets” whereby a court, when issuing a decree
of divorce, orders a transfer of the other spouse’s assets or such
part of the other spouse’s assets to the first-mentioned spouse as
the court deems just. Apposite provisions of Section 7 determine
that:
 the redistribution dispensation only applies to marriages
with complete separation of property entered into before
the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act;22
 a court granting a decree of divorce may, on application of
one of the parties to the marriage and in the absence of an
agreement between the parties regarding a division of their
assets, order an equitable redistribution of assets in favor of
the applying party;23
 the court shall not grant a redistribution order unless it is
satisfied that it is equitable and just to do so by reason of
the fact that the party in whose favor the order is granted
contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance or
increase of the estate of the other party during the
subsistence of the marriage, either by the rendering of
services, or the saving of expenses which would otherwise
have been incurred, or in any other manner;24 and
 in determining the extent of the redistribution of assets the
court shall take into account inter alia the existing means of
22. Divorce Act 70 of 1979 § 7(3).
23. Id.
24. Id. at § 7(4).
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both parties, any donations made inter partes, as well as
any other factor which the court deems pertinent.25
It is evident from the preceding exposition that equitable
considerations underpin the Divorce Act’s dispensation on the
redistribution of assets; moreover, that a court’s power to issue a
redistribution order is not only discretionary in nature but is also
designed to achieve a just patrimonial settlement between the
divorcing spouses. The Appellate Division26 confirmed this truism
in Beaumont v. Beaumont27 when it said:
[T]he feature of overriding importance in the exercise of
the Court’s discretion as to what proportion of assets is to
be transferred in terms of subsection (3) is the court’s
assessment of what would be “just,” having regard to the
factors mentioned specifically and to “any other factor
which should in the opinion of the Court be taken into
account.
. . . The Legislature has seen fit to confer a wide discretion
upon the courts, and the flexibility in the application of
subsection (3) thus created ought not . . . to be curtailed by
placing judicial glosses on the subsection in the form of
guidelines as to the determination of what would be a just
redistribution order.28
It is important to note at this juncture that South African law,
unlike its Anglo-American counterparts, is not typified by equity
as a body of law. South African courts are not permitted, therefore,
to grant relief exclusively on the ground of equity in instances
where a statute and/or the common law do not afford apposite
remedies.29 However, the South African legislature can incorporate
notions such as reasonableness, fairness, equity and justness into
statutory prescripts, usually in conjunction with other objectively25. Id. at § 7(5).
26. The former appellation of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
27. Beaumont v. Beaumont 1987 (1) SA 967 (A).
28. Id. at 991E–H (emphasis added).
29. In Potgieter and Another v. Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637
(SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal cautioned strenuously against judicial
invocation of reasonableness and fairness as freestanding norms by reason of the
potential for “intolerable legal uncertainty” and the resultant threat to the rule of
law in South Africa: paras. 34, 36.
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determinable criteria. Section 7 of the Divorce Act serves as a
good example in this regard—a court in divorce proceedings can
order an equitable redistribution of assets in favor of one of the
spouses who was married subject to a complete separation of
property, but the Section also sets out a number of objectivelydeterminable criteria for the court to consider in the exercise of its
discretion.
III. “GOING BEHIND THE TRUST FORM:” A SYNOPSIS
It was shown in the article’s introduction that claims regarding
trust assets in divorce proceedings have arisen with regard to alter
ego trusts in particular. These claims called for courts to consider
trust assets alongside the assets in a spouse’s personal estate or the
assets in the spouses’ joint estate. Claimants in these cases invoked
the power of South African courts to go behind the trust form in
order to provide relief in instances where trustees abused trusts
through a disregard of the South African trust’s core idea. 30 This
phenomenon in divorce cases calls for some elaboration regarding
the judicial power to go behind the trust form. A number of South
African legal scholars have recently canvassed this topic31 and
their endeavors need not be repeated here. It is, nevertheless,
important to note de Waal’s submission that the cases to date
where South African courts raised the possibility of going behind
the trust form concerned instances in which trustees violated the
core idea of the South African trust through their failure to adhere
to the basic principles or core duties of trust administration.32 De
Waal identifies the following as being among those principles or
duties typically disregarded by trustees who treat trusts as their
alter ego: the duty to exercise independence of judgment and
30. See supra Part I.
31. See, e.g., Marius J. de Waal, The Abuse of the Trust (or: “Going Behind
the Trust Form”), 76 RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L. PRIV. L. 1078 (2012); Anton van
der Linde, Debasement of the Core Idea of a Trust and the Need to Protect
Third Parties, 75 J. CONTEMP. ROMAN-DUTCH L. 371 (2012).
32. de Waal, supra note 31, at 1095.
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independent discretion; the duty to give effect to the trust deed,
properly interpreted; and the principle that trustees must act with
care, diligence and skill in the performance of their duties and the
exercise of their powers.33 The joint-action rule, which requires cotrustees to act jointly at all times, can be added to this list.34 In Van
Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others35 the Court
emphasized, furthermore, that South African courts’ power to
remedy, when apposite, the abuse of the trust is founded upon a
need to curb the unconscionable effects of trustees’ non-adherence
to the aforementioned basic principles or core duties of trust
administration. This exercise is, per definition, designed to achieve
an equitable outcome. Binns-Ward J. remarked in Van Zyl:
Going behind the trust form . . . essentially represents the
provision by a court of an equitable remedy . . . . I consider
it appropriate to describe it as an equitable remedy in the
ordinary, rather than technical, sense of the term; one that
lends itself to a flexible approach to fairly and justly
address the consequences of an unconscionable abuse of
the trust form in given circumstances. It is a remedy that
will generally be given when the trust form is used in a
dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade a liability, or
avoid an obligation.36
This dictum reveals that trustees’ abuse of the trust form
frequently comes to light when they attempt, by invoking their
failure to adhere to the basic principles or core duties of trust
administration, to “evade a liability, or avoid an obligation” in a
dishonest or unconscionable manner. South African case law
shows that such attempts on the part of trustees to extricate
themselves from a liability or an obligation is consistently part of a
33. Id.
34. In Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others
2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA), the Court characterized the joint-action rule as
foundational to the development of South African trust law: para. 15. See also
François du Toit, Co-Trusteeship and the Joint-Action Rule in South African
Trust Law, 27 TRUST L. INT’L. 18 (2013).
35. Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 452
(WCC).
36. Id. at para. 22.
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larger stratagem, namely to conduct trust affairs with an utter
disregard for the existence of the trust by treating the trust property
as their own (in other words, by treating the trust as their alter ego)
but then to invoke the existence of the trust only when it suits
them.37 In Thorpe and Others v. Trittenwein and Another38 the
Supreme Court of Appeal strenuously condemned this practice
when it said that “[t]hose who choose to conduct business through
the medium of trusts . . . cannot enjoy the advantage of a trust
when it suits them and cry foul when it does not.”39
The above exposition shows that South African courts will
generally go behind the trust form to grant relief consequent upon
trustees’ abuse of a trust when the trustees failed to adhere to the
basic principles or core duties of trust administration; when they
dishonestly or unconscionably relied on that very failure,
frequently to extricate themselves from a liability or an obligation
incurred as trustees; and when the trust was nothing more than the
trustees’ alter ego, with its existence invoked only when it suited
the trustees.40 It is important to note at this point that South African
courts have drawn a vitally important distinction between the
aforementioned abused-trust scenario on the one hand, and the
sham-trust scenario on the other hand. In Van Zyl v. Kaye the Court

37. See, e.g., Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC
and Others; Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Bosman and Others 2010 (5) SA
555 (WC) para. 39.
38. Thorpe and Others v. Trittenwein and Another 2007 (2) SA 172 (SCA).
39. Id. at para. 17.
40. See further Rees and Others v. Harris and Others 2012 (1) SA 583
(GSJ) where the Court said that:
where the trustees of a trust clearly do not treat the trust as a separate
entity, and where special circumstances exist to show that there has
been an abuse of the trust entity by a trustee, the [trust] veneer must be
pierced. It follows that if a legitimately established trust is used
or misused in an improper fashion by its trustees to perpetrate deceit,
and/or fraud, the natural person behind the trust veneer must be held
personally liable (para. 17).
The Supreme Court of Appeal remarked in a similar fashion in WT and Others
v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA) that the “unconscionable abuse of the trust form
through fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose will justify looking behind the
trust form”: para. 31.
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opined, rightly it is submitted, that any finding that a trust is a
sham essentially entails a finding that some or all of the
requirements for the establishment of that trust were not met, or
that the appearance that those requirements were met was in reality
a dissimulation.41 Where, however, trustees abused a trust in the
manner explained earlier in this paragraph, a court may provide
relief by going behind the trust form. The Van Zyl Court pointed
out that going behind the trust form invariably entails an
acceptance of the existence of a trust but necessitates a disregard of
the ordinary consequences of such existence. A court going behind
the trust form may, for example, hold trustees personally liable for
an obligation ostensibly undertaken as trustees, or may hold the
trust bound to transactions ostensibly undertaken by the trustees
acting outside the parameters of their authority or legal capacity.42
It stands to reason, therefore, that the sham-trust scenario leaves no
room whatsoever for going behind the trust form because, in the
words of Binns-Ward J. in Van Zyl, “[w]hen a trust is a sham, it
does not exist and there is nothing to ‘go behind.’”43 The Van Zyl
Court consequently cautioned against an erroneous conflation of,
on the one hand, establishing that a trust is a sham with, on the
other hand, going behind the trust form—the Court distinguished
the two as “fundamentally different undertakings.”44
The synoptic descriptions in Parts II and III of the article on
South African matrimonial property regimes and aspects of the
patrimonial consequences of divorce, along with the judicial
practice of going behind the trust form provide the backdrop
against which South African judgments on claims to trust assets in
divorce proceedings can be considered next.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 19.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 16. See also De Waal, supra note 31, at 1084–1086.
Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 16.
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IV. SOUTH AFRICAN JUDGMENTS ON CLAIMS REGARDING TRUST
ASSETS IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
A. Claims for the Redistribution of Assets
Jordaan v. Jordaan45 was one of the first reported judgments in
which a South African High Court46 had an opportunity to consider
whether, in making a redistribution order under Section 7 of the
Divorce Act, the value of trust assets should be included in the
determination of the value of one of the spouses’ estate. The Court
ordered that the asset values of a number of inter vivos trusts
created by the defendant (the husband) had to be included in the
determination of the value of his personal estate because the
evidence showed that he was in full control of these trusts and
administered the trusts as if the trust property was vested in him
personally.47 It is instructive to note that the Court’s consideration
of the trust asset values occurred with express reference to the
equitable underpinnings of the redistribution dispensation of the
Divorce Act.48 The Court, moreover, distinguished redistribution
claims in terms of the Divorce Act from accrual claims in terms of
the Matrimonial Property Act, and intimated that the former
permits greater scope than the latter for a court to take cognizance
of all benefits enjoyed by a spouse in determining the patrimonial
consequences of a divorce.49
In Badenhorst v. Badenhorst50 the Supreme Court of Appeal
subsequently acknowledged the Jordaan judgment and elaborated
on the reasoning upon which an inclusion of the asset value of a
trust in the value of a spouse’s personal estate toward the making
of a redistribution order is founded. The Badenhorst case also
illustrates the typical circumstances in which a trust may be
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C).
At the time still known as the Supreme Court.
Jordaan, 2001 (3) SA 288 (C), paras. 24–34.
Id. at paras. 21, 34.
Id. at para. 22.
Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA).

670

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

considered as the alter ego of one of its trustees. In casu a husband
(the plaintiff in the court of first instance, and the defendant on
appeal) sued his wife (the appellant, and the defendant in the court
of first instance) for a decree of divorce. The appellant
counterclaimed in the court of first instance and, because the
marriage was concluded out of community of property prior to the
commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act, requested a
redistribution of assets in terms of Section 7 of the Divorce Act.
The appellant’s claim included the averment that the Court had to
consider the assets of an inter vivos trust, of which the defendant
was a co-trustee, in addition to the assets in the defendant’s
personal estate. She contended, in support of this averment, that
the trust was no more than the defendant’s alter ego.51 The court of
first instance held that the trust in question constituted a separate
legal entity and, therefore, that its assets had to be disregarded for
the purpose of making a redistribution order.52 The appellant
appealed against this aspect of the court of first instance’s
judgment.
The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged the fact that the
trust assets were vested in its trustees and, therefore, did not form
part of the defendant’s personal estate. The Court opined, however,
that this fact did not per se exclude those assets from being
considered for the purpose of making a redistribution order.53 The
Court opined, furthermore, that, for the appellant to succeed in her
claim that the Court should consider the value of the trust assets in
its ruling on redistribution, she had to show that the defendant not
only controlled the trust de jure as trustee, but was indeed in de
facto control thereof in that, but for the trust, the trust assets would
have vested in his personal estate. In order to determine whether
the defendant exercised such de facto control over the trust, the
Court had regard to the provisions of the trust deed as well as the
51. Id. at paras. 1–2.
52. Id. at paras. 5, 7.
53. Id. at para. 9.
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manner in which the trustees conducted trust administration during
the subsistence of the marriage.54 The Court noted, as far as the
provisions of the trust deed were concerned, that, inter alia, the
trust’s two co-trustees could determine the vesting dates of the
trust income and capital benefits; the trust deed conferred on the
defendant the right to discharge his co-trustee and to appoint
another in his stead; the trustees enjoyed an unfettered discretion to
deal with the trust income and capital as they saw fit; and the
defendant received remuneration for the performance of his duties
as trustee.55 As far as the manner of trust administration was
concerned, the Court noted that the defendant blatantly ignored the
joint-action rule because he seldom sought the approval of his cotrustee for actions performed on behalf of the trust; he listed trust
assets as his own in a credit application; he insured a beach
cottage—a trust asset—in his own name; and the trust financed a
fixed property owned by the defendant.56 The Court concluded that
the foregoing had the cumulative effect of placing the defendant
“in full control of the trust,”57 which, in the Court’s opinion,
justified the addition of the trust asset value to that of the
defendant’s personal estate.58 The Court ordered, therefore, that the
defendant had to make a redistribution payment of ZAR 1,25
million to the appellant. The Court arrived at this amount by taking
into account the net asset values of the parties’ respective estates as
well as the trust asset value, and by calculating a percentage that it
considered a just and equitable reflection of the appellant’s
contribution to the defendant’s estate.59
54. Id. In Brunette v. Brunette and Another NO 2009 (5) SA 81 (SE) the
Court concurred when it said that “the manner in which the trusts had been
administered in the past becomes highly relevant in determining whether or
not . . . assets [are] to be taken into account in any distribution order in terms of
§ 7(3) of the Divorce Act”: § 4. See also B v. B [2014] ZAECPEHC 33 (May 29,
2014) para.26.
55. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 10.
56. Id. at para. 11.
57. Id.
58. Id. at para. 13.
59. Id. at para. 16.
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It is interesting to note that the defendant’s personal estate in
the Badenhorst case was valued at just under ZAR 1,9 million.60
He could, therefore, make the full redistribution payment from his
personal estate, and there was no need for the Court to find that the
trust assets in fact vested in him personally and could be used
toward satisfaction of the appellant’s successful redistribution
claim. In fact, the appellant in Badenhorst never sought an order
depriving the trust of its assets; this fact also explains why there
was no need to join the trust (or its trustees) in Badenhorst in the
suit.61 In Zazeraj NO v. Jordaan and Others,62 a follow-up
judgment to the aforementioned judgment in Jordaan v. Jordaan,
the Court also confirmed that, in Jordaan v. Jordaan, no finding
was made that the various trusts’ assets in fact vested in the
defendant; moreover, that the Jordaan Court’s finding that the
trusts in question were the alter ego of the defendant did not per se
imply that the Court regarded these trusts’ assets as the defendant’s
personal assets.63
The aforementioned considerations may explain why, in the
subsequent judgment in Van Zyl v. Kaye,64 the Court opined that
the Badenhorst judgment was not a case in which the Court went
behind the trust form because “[i]t was left to Mr Badenhorst [the
defendant] to decide how to make payment in terms of the court
order.”65 The Van Zyl Court ostensibly regarded only the relief that
culminates in a judgment against a trust or, alternatively, an order
that trust assets are exigible at the instance of the party in whose
favor the order is granted, as instances of going behind the trust
60. Id. at para. 4.
61. See also Pringle v. Pringle [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), para.
6.
62. Zazeraj NO v. Jordaan and Others [2012] ZAWCHC 120 (March 22,
2012).
63. Id. at para. 19. See also Pringle, [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009),
para. 6. See further Van Greune NO and Another v. Van Greune, In re: Van
Greune v. Van Greune and Others [2013] ZAGPPHC 291 (October 14, 2013).
64. Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA 452
(WCC).
65. Id. at para. 24.
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form.66 However, as pointed out earlier,67 the Van Zyl Court also
emphasized that trustees’ unconscionable abuse of the trust is
foundational to South African courts’ power to grant apposite
relief by going behind the trust form.68 In this light, the Van Zyl
Court conceded that its assessment of the Badenhorst case may be
incorrect, and that the Badenhorst judgment can be construed as
one where the Court granted the relief sought by reason of the
defendant’s opportunistic resort to the existence of the trust as an
unconscionable means to evade the obligations attendant on the
dissolution of his marriage.69
The foregoing begs the question of whether it is within the
competence of a South African court, when it makes a
redistribution order in terms of Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, to
include therein a directive that the assets of an alter ego trust be
used in satisfaction of the successful redistribution claim. Can a
court, in other words, order that, by reason of a trustee-spouse’s
abuse of a trust, the assets of that alter ego trust in fact vest in the
trustee-spouse personally and can be used to meet the other
spouse’s redistribution claim? The Supreme Court of Appeal’s
initial view on going behind the trust form in Land and
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker suggests an
affirmative answer to this question. The Court said that trustees’
conduct may invite the inference that “the trust form was a mere
cover for the conduct of business ‘as before’, and that the assets
allegedly vesting in trustees in fact belong to one or more of the
trustees.”70 However, in Van Zyl v. Kaye the Court opined that,
66. Id.
67. See supra Part III.
68. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para. 22.
69. Id. at para. 24. Also, see generally Eben Nel, An Interpretive Account of
Unconscionability in Trust Law, 35 OBITER 81 (2014).
70. Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker and Others 2005
(2) SA 77 (SCA), para. 37.3. See also, e.g., First Rand Limited trading inter alia
as First National Bank v. Britz and Others [2011] ZAGPPHC 119 (July 20, 2011)
where the Court, in a judgment on alter ego trusts (though not in the context of a
redistribution order under the Divorce Act), ruled that, by virtue of trustees’
excessive and comprehensive control over two trusts, these trusts’ assets indeed

674

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

where a trust was validly created and continued its existence as
such, trustees’ maladministration of the assets vested in such a
properly-constituted trust cannot sustain an averment that the
assets no longer vest in the trust’s trustees officially, but vest in
them personally; such an averment is, according to the Van Zyl
Court, sustainable only upon proof that the trust in question is a
sham.71 It is, in this light, unsurprising that the Supreme Court of
Appeal in WT v. KT72 rendered a judgment, discussed in greater
detail below,73 in which it expressed doubt as to whether even the
wide discretion bestowed on courts by Section 7(3) of the Divorce
Act permits a court, when going behind the trust form in giving a
redistribution order, to rule that trust assets in fact vest in a trusteespouse’s personal estate, rather than merely to include the trust
asset value into that of the trustee-spouse’s personal estate.74 A
ruling that trust assets in fact vest in the personal estate of a
trustee-spouse is, as stated in the Van Zyl case, efficient only upon
a finding that the trust at hand is a sham.
It is, in light of the foregoing, instructive to note that at least
one South African commentator has viewed the Badenhorst
judgment as one in which the Court indeed regarded the trust in
question as a sham.75 However, South African legal scholarship76
and jurisprudence77 subsequently confirmed that a trust such as the
one in the Badenhorst case is not a sham—it is a validlyconstituted trust, but one in respect of which the trustees (or, in
Badenhorst, the defendant as the dominant co-trustee)

vested in the trustees personally. The Court ordered, consequently, that the trust
assets could be attached in satisfaction of a judgment debt against the two
trustees in their personal capacities: para. 69.
71. Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC), para.18.
72. WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA).
73. See infra Part IV. C.
74. WT, 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para.36.
75. Harry Joffe, “Sham” Trusts, DE REBUS 25, 26 (January/February 2007).
76. de Waal, supra note 31, at 1086.
77. Van Heerden v. Van Heerden and Others [2011] ZAWCHC 209 (May 4,
2011), § 9. See also generally Van Zyl, 2014 (4) SA 452 (WCC).
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unconscionably abused the trust through non-adherence to some of
the basic principles or core duties of trust administration. In the
Badenhorst case, the defendant’s failure to adhere to the
fundamentals of trust administration, particularly the joint-action
rule, and, thereby, his treatment of the trust as his alter ego,
justified the Court order regarding the addition of the asset value of
the trust to that of his personal estate for the purpose of making the
redistribution order. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that a trust needs
not be declared a sham in order for its asset value to be included in
a court’s valuation of a party’s estate for the purpose of making a
redistribution order.78
South African cases on point also show that the purpose for
which a trust was created is, although not irrelevant, not
necessarily determinative to a court ruling on the inclusion of the
asset value of such a trust in a spouse’s personal estate for the
purpose of making a redistribution order. In Badenhorst, for
example, the trust at issue was created in order to protect the
spouses against creditors as well as to curb the payment of
inheritance tax79—quite legitimate purposes on its face. In Jordaan
v. Jordaan,80 by contrast, the defendant (the husband) admitted to
create one of the trusts in question shortly after the commencement
of the divorce proceedings as part of a fraudulent scheme to
obscure assets from the plaintiff (his wife).81 The Badenhorst and
Jordaan courts both acceded to the respective prayers to add the
relevant trusts’ asset values to the values of the relevant parties’
personal estates, and did so notwithstanding the fact that, in the
former case, the trust in question was established for legitimate
purposes, whereas, in the latter case, the trust was set up to achieve
a distinctly unlawful purpose. However, in Maritz v. Maritz82 the
78. See also Childs v. Childs and Others NNO 2003 (3) SA 138 (C) 146E.
The sham-trust issue is discussed further and in greater detail in Part IV. B.
79. Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 4.
80. Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C).
81. Id. at para. 17.6.
82. Maritz v. Maritz [2006] JOL 16569 (T).
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Court expressly distinguished the Jordaan case from the one at
hand, and did so, inter alia, on the basis that, in Maritz, the
plaintiff (against whom the defendant sought a redistribution order
that encompassed also the asset value of an inter vivos trust of
which the plaintiff and defendant were the co-trustees) did not
exhibit any of the “dishonest and mean attributes” exhibited by the
defendant in the Jordaan case.83 The defendant’s prayer for the
inclusion of the trust asset value in the plaintiff’s personal estate
value for the purpose of making a redistribution order in the Maritz
case proved unsuccessful.84 The Maritz judgment therefore
underscores the fact that the purpose of the trust(s) in question is
not wholly irrelevant to the courts’ adjudication on the
consideration of trust asset values in redistribution claims.
Maritz v. Maritz evinced another feature that distinguishes it
from the earlier judgment in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst. It was
shown above that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Badenhorst paid
particular attention to evidence that indicated how the defendant
treated trust assets as if they were his own when he conducted his
personal business or financial affairs. In Maritz, on the other hand,
the Court was on the alert that the trustees maintained the trust’s
financial records and annual financial statements separate from
those of the plaintiff. Moreover, the trust’s financial statements
were prepared by an auditor and examples of these served before
the Court. The plaintiff’s separate financial statements also served
before the Court. The Court could, therefore, scrutinize both sets of
documents. These documents indicated, inter alia, that the trust
and the plaintiff were assessed separately for income tax
purposes.85 The Court also observed that each instance where the
plaintiff advanced money to the trust and, conversely, where the
trust advanced money to the plaintiff was reflected separately in
the relevant financial statements. Moreover, movements on these
83. Id. at paras. 18–19.
84. Id. at para. 22.
85. Id. at para. 16.
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loan accounts were supported by relevant documents and
explanations. In this light, the Court could not be persuaded that
the manner in which the plaintiff dealt with the trust assets in his
capacity as trustee justified a finding that the trust was his alter ego
and that the value of the trust assets had to be considered toward
determining the value of his personal estate.86 However, a trustee’s
separation of the financial dealings of a trust from his or her
personal financial affairs will not necessarily ensure the exclusion
of the trust asset value from consideration additional to the value
of the trustee’s personal estate for the purpose of making a
redistribution order. In Pienaar v. Pienaar and Another,87 for
example, the plaintiff contended that the asset value of a trust, of
which the defendant was the co-dominant trustee, had to be
included in the value of the defendant’s personal estate for the
purpose of effecting a redistribution of assets. The Court
acknowledged that, despite the fact that a separate bank account
was opened and operated for the trust, the defendant nevertheless
treated the principal trust asset, a farm, as well as the rentals
received in respect thereof, as his own. The Court ruled,
consequently, that the farm’s value had to be added to the value of
the defendant’s personal estate for the purpose of making a
redistribution order.88
The foregoing analysis shows that claims regarding the
consideration of trust assets toward the granting of redistribution
orders in divorce proceedings have posed various challenges to
South African courts in the recent past. South African courts have
responded to these challenges in a fairly principled and consistent
manner. Any divergences between judgments on the matter can be
explained by the factual peculiarities of the cases at hand. Are
similar trends evident from South African courts’ engagement with
86. Id. at para. 17.
87. Pienaar v. Pienaar and Another [2005] ZAWCHC 123 (January 1,
2005).
88. Id. at para. 44.
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claims regarding the consideration of trust assets for the purpose of
realizing accrual claims in divorce proceedings? This question is
addressed in the next Part of the article.
B. Accrual Claims
The first South African judgments regarding the consideration
of trust assets toward the realization of accrual claims were handed
down around the same time that jurisprudence emerged on claims
regarding the consideration of trust assets toward the issuing of
redistribution orders.89 In Pringle v. Pringle,90 for example, the
plaintiff in a matrimonial dispute asked the Court to consider the
assets of an inter vivos trust, of which her husband, the defendant,
was the sole trustee, for the purpose of realizing her accrual claim
against the defendant. She contended that the principles enunciated
and applied in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases with regard to the
treatment of alter ego trusts under the Divorce Act’s redistribution
dispensation applied mutatis mutandis to the Matrimonial Property
Act’s accrual dispensation.91
The Pringle Court saw no reason in principle why trust assets
may not in appropriate circumstances be taken into account in the
assessment of the accrual of spouses’ estates upon the dissolution
of their marriage.92 The Court emphasized, moreover, that in casu
the plaintiff did not seek an order divesting the trust of its assets;
the plaintiff merely prayed that the trust asset value had to be
considered toward the determination of the accrual of the
defendant’s estate. The Court opined that, consequently, the trust
did not have to be joined in the suit.93 The Court granted the
plaintiff’s prayer, and did so with particular reference to the de
facto control that the defendant exercised over the trust in his
89. Smith v. Smith and Another SECLD case No. 619/2006 was one of the
first unreported judgments on point.
90. Pringle v. Pringle [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009).
91. Id. at para. 1.
92. Id. at para. 2.
93. Id. at para. 8.
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capacity of trustee.94 It is instructive to note that the Court in
Pringle, like the Court in Jordaan v. Jordaan before it,95
distinguished the Divorce Act’s stipulations on the redistribution of
assets on the one hand, from the Matrimonial Property Act’s
directives regarding accrual claims on the other hand. The Court
said that, whereas Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act endows a court
with a discretion to issue a redistribution order that is just and
equitable, no such discretion is conferred by Section 3(1) of the
Matrimonial Property Act—under the latter provision the extent of
an accrual claim is strictly a mathematical calculation in
accordance with the formula prescribed by the Matrimonial
Property Act.96 The Pringle Court did not, however, view this
difference as a bar to the application of the principles formulated
and applied in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases to the
Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation.97
The trend of considering trust assets in accrual claims
continued in BC v. CC and Others.98 However, aspects of this
94. Id. at para. 17.
95. See supra Part IV. A.
96. See supra Part II on the formula applicable to the calculation of accrual.
97. Pringle, [2009] ZAWCHC 207 (March 27, 2009), para. 2. In AM v. JM
[2010] ZAWCHC 226 (December 10, 2010) the Court subsequently
acknowledged the Pringle judgment, particularly its affirmation that the
principles laid down in the Jordaan and Badenhorst cases can be invoked for the
purpose of including a trust’s asset value in the determination of the extent of an
accrual claim upon the dissolution of a marriage. In AM v. JM the Court
followed suit and ordered that the asset value of an inter vivos trust of which the
defendant was the dominant co-trustee had to be taken into account in the
determination of the defendant’s estate accrual. The Court did so by reason of
copious evidence that the defendant did not deal with the trust “at arm’s length”
but was, from the trust’s inception, in sole and absolute control of its affairs:
paras. 17–18. In K v. K [2014] ZAGPPHC 242 (March 7, 2014), on the other
hand, the Court denied the defendant’s counterclaim for the addition of two inter
vivos trusts’ asset values to the plaintiff’s personal estate value for the purpose
of determining the accrual of that estate. The Court did so because the evidence
adduced did not support the defendant’s averment that the trusts in question
were in fact the plaintiff’s alter ego. The Court, in arriving at this conclusion,
distinguished the facts of the Badenhorst case from the facts of the case before it
and, therefore, did not make a finding on the applicability of the Badenhorst
case to the consideration of the asset values of trusts in accrual claims: paras.
34–35.
98. BC v. CC and Others 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP).
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particular judgment are perplexing. In casu the plaintiff instituted
divorce proceedings against the first defendant to whom she was
married out of community of property but subject to the accrual
system. She sought an order directing, inter alia, that the value of
assets held by an inter vivos trust, of which the first defendant was
both the settlor as well as the dominant co-trustee, be taken into
consideration in determining the accrual of his estate for the
purpose of her accrual claim under the Matrimonial Property Act.
The plaintiff alleged in support of this prayer that the first
defendant was in full control of the trust and of the acquisition,
management and sale of trust assets.99 The first defendant
countered by pleading in limine that the plaintiff’s particulars of
claim were deficient for three reasons: it conflicted with Section 12
of the Trust Property Control Act regarding the separateness of a
trust estate in a trustee’s hands;100 the Matrimonial Property Act
does not vest a court with any discretion to include assets other
than a spouse’s personal assets in the determination of the accrual
of such a spouse’s estate; and the plaintiff failed to plead that the
trust had to be set aside, or that the trust assets were in fact the first
defendant’s property or had to be deemed as such.101 The first
defendant contended that, consequently, the trust assets could not
be considered for the purpose of ascertaining the accrual of his
personal estate. He argued in particular that, given the
aforementioned absence under the Matrimonial Property Act of a
judicial discretion commensurate to that under the Divorce Act’s
redistribution dispensation to ensure that a divorce yields a just and
equitable pecuniary outcome, the court is not permitted to interfere
with the spouses’ contractual rights regarding accrual as
determined by their pre-nuptial contract.102

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at para. 15.
See supra Part I.
BC, 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP), para. 3.
Id. at para. 7.
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The Court, in addressing the aforementioned arguments
proffered by the first defendant, acknowledged the directive in
Section 12 of the Trust Property Control Act, but opined that the
said directive is inapplicable where a sham trust is at hand. Where,
therefore, the parties who ostensibly set up a “trust” never intended
the formation of a trust, or never intended for the so-called trustees
to hold the supposed trust assets for the would-be trust
beneficiaries, no trust would come into existence and the assets of
the “trust” would remain the de facto property of either the
supposed settlor or the beneficial owner of the particular assets.
The Court opined that, in such a case, the simulated creation of the
“trust” could be set aside, and the settlor or beneficial owner would
then be identified as the true owner of the assets concerned—if the
settlor or beneficial owner is a spouse to a marriage subject to the
accrual system, the supposed trust assets will indeed constitute
assets in that spouse’s personal estate.103 The Court opined,
furthermore, that the consideration of the asset value of a trust
toward determining the accrual of a spouse’s estate under the
Matrimonial Property Act does not amount to the exercise of a
discretion—it entails a factual inquiry similar to the one conducted
for the purpose of the inclusion of a trust’s asset value toward
determining the extent of a spouse’s redistribution claim under the
Divorce Act. The Court, therefore, disagreed with the defendants’
contention that, unlike redistribution claims, accrual claims do not
warrant consideration of trust assets.104 The Court opined, finally,
that, if the plaintiff’s allegations were shown to be correct, the
plaintiff would succeed in proving that the assets ostensibly owned
by the trust, or some of those assets, were de facto the
first defendant’s property, and, therefore, that their value ought to
be taken into account in determining the extent to which the first
defendant’s estate accrued stante matrimonio. The Court ruled that
the plaintiff’s failure to plead specifically that such assets be
103. Id. at para. 8.
104. Id. at paras. 9–10.
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deemed to be the first defendant’s assets was not fatal to the
plaintiff’s case.105 The Court consequently dismissed the points of
law that the defendants raised in limine.106
Whilst the judgment in BC v. CC provides further affirmation
for the consideration of trust assets in accrual claims, the basis
upon which the Court was willing to do so in casu is not altogether
clear. The Court seems to suggest, on the one hand, that such
consideration is appropriate where the “trust” at hand is a sham
and the supposed trust assets are in fact the property of the party
who actually derives benefit therefrom.107 On the other hand, the
Court considered judgments, including the Jordaan and
Badenhorst cases, which it typified as cases where “[t]he courts
have in the past identified beneficial owners as the true owners of
trust assets in matrimonial cases.”108 A scenario in which the
beneficial owner of trust assets is in fact the true owner of those
assets is certainly evocative of the state of affairs under a sham
trust.109 However, it was pointed out earlier110 that the trusts in the
105. Id. at para. 18.
106. Id. at para. 19.
107. Id. at para. 8.
108. Id. at para. 10.
109. de Waal, supra note 31, observes that, in the sham-trust scenario where
the parties to a simulated creation of a trust lacked the actual intention to
establish a trust but rather intended to benefit the recipient of the “trust assets,”
the supposed trust is disregarded and the recipient acquires the assets in his or
her personal capacity free from any burden to hold it on trust: at 1096–1097.
Similarly, in Van Zyl and Another NNO v. Kaye NO and Others 2014 (4) SA
452 (WCC), the applicants, the provisional trustees in the insolvent estate of
Kaye, applied for an order that an immovable property held in trust was in fact
an asset in Kaye’s insolvent estate. They averred that the trust was Kaye’s alter
ego, and they urged the Court to go behind the trust form by ordering that the
immovable property formed part of Kaye’s insolvent estate. The Court
dismissed the application on the ground that the relief sought by the applicants
was misconceived. Binns-Ward J. said that the applicants’ objective was to have
a mortgage over the particular immovable property set aside, and that that
objective could be achieved only if they could show that the immovable
property was not a trust asset but rather an asset in Kaye’s personal estate.
According to Binns-Ward J. only proof that the trust was a sham would yield
such a result because then the trustees would not have acquired the immovable
property for the trust but rather as Kaye’s agents, which, in turn, would occasion
the property to form part of the principal’s (Kaye’s) personal estate. Binns-Ward
J. was adamant, however, that Kaye’s treatment of the trust as his alter ego did
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Jordaan and Badenhorst cases were not sham trusts—they were
validly-constituted trusts whose trustees abused the trusts through
non-adherence to the fundamentals of trust administration. It was
also pointed out earlier111 that the Jordaan and Badenhorst courts
did not rule that the respective trustees in fact personally owned
the assets of the trusts in question; instead, the two courts regarded
the trusts at hand as genuine trusts (with the respective trustees as
the owners of trust assets qua trustees) but, by reason of the
trustees’ unconscionable treatment of those trusts as their alter ego,
the Jordaan and Badenhorst courts went behind the trust form
through consideration of the trust asset values for purposes of
making redistribution orders.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court in BC v. CC fell prey
to the very danger against which the Court in Van Zyl v. Kaye
cautioned,112 namely an unwholesome conflation of the law
pertaining to sham trusts on the one hand, and alter ego trusts on
the other hand. This conflation is, arguably, most evident when
Dambuza J., who delivered the BC judgment, stated:
[I]f the plaintiff’s allegations are proved to be correct, the
plaintiff will have succeeded in proving that the assets
ostensibly owned by the trust, or some of them, are de facto
the property of the first defendant . . . .The fact that the
plaintiff has not pleaded specifically that such assets be
deemed to be the assets of the plaintiff113 is not . . . fatal to
the plaintiff’s case in the light of the allegation that such
assets are under de facto ownership of the first defendant
and that the trust is his alter ego.114

not render the trust a sham and, therefore, that going behind the trust form could
not yield the outcome that the applicants desired: paras. 15, 29.
110. See supra Part IV. A.
111. Id.
112. See supra Part III.
113. This is apparently an erroneous reference to the plaintiff—the Court
should have referred to the first defendant.
114. BC v. CC and Others 2012 (5) SA 562 (ECP), para. 18 (emphasis
added).
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It must be reiterated that, when assets are deemed to be the
personal assets of a trustee because that trustee is the de facto
owner of those assets (in the sense that the trustee—and not the
trust beneficiaries—was intended all along as the beneficial owner
of those assets), the “trust” at hand, contrary to the Court in BC v.
CC’s above standpoint, is not an alter ego trust, but may well be a
sham trust. It is clear, therefore, that aspects of the judgment in BC
v. CC are open to criticism by reason of the Court’s ostensible
conflation of the law pertaining to sham trusts with that regarding
alter ego trusts. The judgment nevertheless extended the earlier
series of cases in which South African courts were favorably
disposed toward considering trust assets in the assessment of
accrual claims. The subsequent judgment in MM and Others v.
JM115 questioned the legal foundation upon which this series of
cases rested.
In MM v. JM the plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings
against the first defendant who, in a claim in reconvention, sought
an order for an accrual payment in accordance with their
matrimonial property regime. The principal issue before the Court
was whether the asset value of an inter vivos trust, of which the
plaintiff was the settlor and the dominant co-trustee, could be taken
into account toward establishing the accrual of the plaintiff’s
estate. The defendant pleaded that the trust was the plaintiff’s alter
ego and that, consequently, its assets should be considered
alongside his personal assets for the purpose of determining the
accrual of his estate. She did not, however, aver that the plaintiff
was in fact the beneficial owner of the trust assets, nor did she
maintain that the trust was a sham. Her case was that the trust
assets had to be taken into account toward determining the accrual
of the plaintiff’s estate because he had the power and the ability to
use those assets for his sole benefit.116 The defendant sought

115. MM and Others v. JM 2014 (4) SA 384 (KZP).
116. Id. at paras. 4, 6.
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support for this contention in the judgments, discussed earlier,117 in
which trust assets were considered toward effecting the
redistribution of assets in terms of the Divorce Act.118
The Court in MM, unlike its predecessor in BC, regarded a
redistribution order in terms of the Divorce Act as fundamentally
different from an accrual claim in terms of the Matrimonial
Property Act in that, in the former instance, a court is required to
make a discretionary assessment of what it deems just, whereas no
such assessment is made in the latter instance in terms of the strict
mathematical calculation of accrual prescribed by the Matrimonial
Property Act.119 The Court opined, therefore, that a judgment such
as Badenhorst on the redistribution of assets provides no authority
for the proposition that trust assets can be considered toward
determining the accrual of the estate of one spouse for the purpose
of realizing the other spouse’s accrual claim.120 The Court in MM
questioned, moreover, the BC Court’s view that the determination
of which assets are to be so considered is the same for purposes of
the Divorce Act and the Matrimonial Property Act. The MM Court
evidently viewed the absence of a judicial discretion regarding the
calculation of accrual claims under the latter Act as an absolute bar
to any equation of the two instances.121 The MM Court concluded,
therefore, that the defendant’s claim in reconvention was invalid
because the Matrimonial Property Act reveals no legal basis for an
order that trust assets, which do not form part of one spouse’s
personal estate could, on the ground of justness, be deemed to form
part of it for purposes of determining the accrual of that spouse’s
estate.122
The judgment in MM v. JM, being at odds with its predecessors
in Pringle and BC, certainly complicated the topic under
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See supra Part IV. A.
MM 2014 (4) SA 384 (KZP), paras. 7–11.
Id. at paras. 12, 19.
Id. at para. 13.
Id. at paras. 17, 19.
Id. at paras. 19–20.
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discussion. RP v. DP and Others123 subsequently amplified this
complexity through its affirmation of the correctness of the BC
judgment and, by implication, its opposition to the MM
judgment.124 However, aspects of the RP judgment are as
perplexing as those aspects of the BC judgment highlighted earlier.
RP concerned a matrimonial dispute between the applicant (the
wife) and the first defendant (the husband). The first defendant had
earlier instituted divorce proceedings against the applicant, and the
applicant, in a counterclaim, had prayed an accrual payment from
him in accordance with their matrimonial property regime. The
applicant, in the application proceedings before the Court in RP v.
DP, prayed the joinder of an inter vivos trust’s trustees to the suit
and asked, furthermore, that the asset value of said trust be
considered toward establishing the value of the first defendant’s
estate for the purpose of her accrual claim. She contended that,
from the trust’s inception, the first defendant was, as the dominant
co-trustee, in de facto control of its assets and that he used the trust
as a vehicle to accumulate wealth for his personal benefit. The
applicant averred, therefore, that the trust was the first defendant’s
alter ego and, had the trust not been created, all its assets would
have vested in the first defendant personally.125 The defendants
(the trustees of the trust) opposed the application and argued that,
since the applicant did not seek to divest the trust of ownership of
its assets or to effect transfer of any of the trust assets to herself or
to the first defendant, the trust had no substantial interest in the
relief claimed and, therefore, should not be joined in the suit.126 In
regard to the applicant’s prayer that the value of the trust assets be
considered toward establishing the accrual of the first defendant’s
123. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP).
124. It must be noted that the judgment in RP v. DP was handed down in the
same division of the High Court as the earlier judgment in BC v. CC and,
therefore, in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis (or legal precedent),
the particular High Court was bound by its own previous judgment.
125. RP, 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), paras. 6–8.
126. Id. at paras. 10, 12.
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estate, the first defendant contended that, while such a
consideration may be appropriate in the context of the Divorce
Act’s discretionary redistribution dispensation, the Matrimonial
Property Act leaves no room for a commensurate judicial
consideration of the asset value of a trust for the purpose of
establishing the accrual of a spouse’s estate.127
The Court, in addressing the first defendant’s contentions,
acknowledged the separate existence of trust estates in trustees’
hands, but also acknowledged that South African courts have in the
past pierced “the veil which separates the trust assets from the
personal assets of the trustee.”128 Regrettably, the RP Court
followed this apt metaphor with a statement that smacks of the BC
Court’s earlier conflation of the law regarding sham trusts with that
regarding alter ego trusts in the context of the abuse of the trust
form. The RP Court said that “[t]his will happen . . . in cases where
the trust is a sham and for all practical purposes is the alter ego of
the founder or trustee.”129 This statement, it is submitted, again
represents an erroneous equation of sham trusts with alter ego
trusts. The aforementioned conflation is confirmed when the Court
opined that the personal assets of a trustee will include what is
notionally regarded as trust assets only through the lifting or
piercing of the trust veil and, therefore, by a finding that the trust is
indeed the alter ego of the trustee and that the so-called trust assets
are assets in the personal estate of the trustee.130 It must be
reiterated at this juncture that, in light of the unequivocal
pronouncement in Van Zyl v. Kaye referred to earlier,131 a trustee’s
abuse of a trust by treating it as his or her alter ego cannot cause
trust assets to vest in such a trustee’s personal estate, nor can a
court go behind the trust form to order such a result. A trustee’s
personal assets can include what is notionally regarded as trust
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at para. 11.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 22.
Id. at para. 35.
See supra Part IV. A.
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assets only when a sham trust is at hand, in which case going
behind the trust form is, again according to the view espoused in
Van Zyl v. Kaye,132 not an appropriate remedy.
The Court in RP, ostensibly referring to piercing the trust veil
in the sense of going behind the trust form, opined further, having
had regard to the judgment in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst in
particular, that the power of a court to pierce the trust veil is
derived from the common law—it is, according to the RP Court,
consequent upon the evidence placed before the court and not upon
the exercise of any judicial discretion.133 The Court, therefore,
regarded piercing the veil that separates a trustee’s personal estate
from the trust estate as a function distinct from, for example, the
exercise of discretion in making a redistribution order under
Section 7 of the Divorce Act.134 The Court viewed the making of a
redistribution order as involving two distinct functions: the first is
a factual determination of “which assets are [a spouse’s] personal
assets,” whereas the second concerns the calculation of a just and
equitable redistribution amount. The first function must not,
according to the Court in RP, “be conflated or confused with the
second function;”135 moreover, the first function, being nondiscretionary in nature, can apply equally to redistribution claims
as well as accrual claims. In consequence of this view, the RP
Court was favorably disposed toward the earlier judgment in BC v.
CC, particularly the BC Court’s reliance on the Jordaan and
Badenhorst cases in performing the aforementioned first function,
namely its finding that the asset value of the alter ego trust could
be taken into account in determining the extent of the accrual of
the first defendant’s personal estate in the BC case.
The RP Court—possibly by reason of its dubious conflation of
the law pertaining to sham trusts with that pertinent to alter ego
132.
133.
134.
135.

See supra Part III.
RP, 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), paras. 24, 31, 35.
Id. at para. 31.
Id. at para. 57.
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trusts—next opined that, in piercing the trust veil, a court is not
required to set aside the entire trust as a simulated deed; it is only
required to set aside those transactions which are proven to be
simulated.136 In fact, Alkema J., who handed down the judgment in
RP, described the applicant’s claim as follows:
Her claim, essentially, is that by virtue of first respondent’s
[defendant’s] abuse of the trust form, many transactions
resulting in the ostensible acquisition of trust assets held by
first respondent as trustee allegedly on behalf of the trust,
are simulated transactions because in truth and in fact
those assets belong to first respondent and are assets in his
personal estate and not in the estate of the trust. She
effectively seeks the simulation to be set aside and claims
an order that those assets be taken into account as personal
assets of the first respondent in determining her accrual
claim.137
Whilst Alkema J.’s above exposition on the effects of setting
aside simulated transactions is indeed correct, it is arguable that a
challenge to individual trustee transactions on the ground that they
were simulations is not typical of going behind the trust form in
order to curb the abuse of a trust. This much is evident from YB v.
SB and Others NNO.138 In this case the plaintiff instituted divorce
proceedings against the first defendant to whom she was married
out of community of property but subject to the accrual system.
The plaintiff and first defendant were among the co-trustees of an
inter vivos trust created during the subsistence of their marriage.
The plaintiff sought to amend her particulars of claim by including
therein a claim that the trustees simulated the acquisition of trust
assets and that these simulated transactions had to be set aside to
acknowledge the first defendant as the de facto beneficial owner of
the assets. The plaintiff averred that the first defendant and the
trustees intended at all material times for the first defendant to be
the beneficial owner of the assets ostensibly held in trust. The
136. Id. at paras. 47, 48, 53.
137. Id. at para. 47.
138. YB v. SB and Others NNO 2016 (1) SA 47 (WCC).
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plaintiff contended, consequently, that the trust assets had to be
added to the value of the first defendant’s personal estate for the
purpose of calculating the accrual of said estate in terms of the
Matrimonial Property Act.139
Riley A.J., in granting the plaintiff’s application to amend her
particulars of claim, pointed out explicitly that the plaintiff’s
application was not based on the averment that the trust in issue
was the first defendant’s alter ego; instead, she plead expressly
that, from the trust’s inception, the assets ostensibly held in trust
were acquired through simulated transactions and, therefore, were
beneficially owned by the first defendant.140 Riley A.J. evidently
regarded a challenge to individual trustee transactions on the
ground that they were simulations as essentially different from
going behind the trust form to curb the abuse of a trust in the alterego-trust scenario. This assertion is fortified by the Acting Judge’s
opinion that, even though the plaintiff’s case in YB v. SB was on all
fours with Alkema J’s above exposition in RP v. DP on the effects
of setting aside simulated transactions,141 it was, nevertheless, “not
necessary to become involved in the so-called alter ego
controversy, as it . . . does not find application.”142 This statement
supports the contention that the setting aside of individual trustee
transactions on the ground that they were simulations is not typical
of going behind the trust form in order to curb the abuse of the
trust form. The better view, it is submitted, is to address the setting
aside of trustee transactions on the ground that they were
simulations in terms of the common-law rules pertinent to
simulated contracts, particularly the application of the maxim plus
valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur.143 This maxim,
139. Id. at paras. 2, 5.
140. Id. at para. 40.
141. Id. at para. 47.
142. Id. at para. 51.
143. The maxim means that the contracting parties’ real intention carries
more weight than a fraudulent formation or pretence: see Zandberg v. Van Zyl
1910 AD 302 309.
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if invoked successfully, will occasion the discarding of any
simulated transactions for the supposed acquisition of trust assets,
and will ensure that effect is given to the contracting parties’ true
intention, namely that the assets acquired under the guise of
trusteeship actually vest in its beneficial owner’s personal estate. It
follows from the foregoing that the RP Court’s engagement with
going behind the trust form in the context of accrual claims is,
unfortunately, not a model of conceptual clarity.
The Court in RP v. DP ruled in the end that the trustees of the
inter vivos trust in question had a real and substantial interest in the
applicant’s claim, and, accordingly, that they should be joined as
parties to the action. The Court also found that the prayer for the
proposed amendment of the applicant’s particulars of claim to
reflect the joinder as well as the claim that certain trust assets
should be considered as assets in the personal estate of the first
defendant should be granted.144
The foregoing analysis shows that prayers regarding the
consideration of trust assets toward the realization of accrual
claims in divorce proceedings have also posed challenges to South
African courts in the recent past. South African courts’ responses
to these challenges have been more varied than their engagement
with the consideration of trust assets toward the issuing of
redistribution orders in divorce proceedings. The judgment in MM
v. JM in particular threw the proverbial cat amongst the pigeons
insofar as it, unlike other judgments on point, espoused a
fundamentally different view on the legal rules applicable to the
treatment of alter ego trusts under the Divorce Act’s redistribution
dispensation compared to the legal rules apposite to the
Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation. A prima facie
resolution to this matter has since been provided by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in a judgment on the addition of trust assets to a
144. RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), para. 58. See also M v. M
[2015] ZAGPPHC 66 (February 4, 2015) for another judgment that yielded an
outcome similar to that in RP v. DP.
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joint estate where the spouses were married in community of
property. This judgment is considered in the next part of the
article.
C. Trust Assets and Joint Estates
While judgments abound on the addition of trust asset values to
those of trustee-spouses’ personal estates under the Divorce Act’s
redistribution dispensation and the Matrimonial Property Act’s
accrual dispensation, only two South African judgments have, at
the time of writing, been handed down on the consideration of trust
assets with regard to a joint estate where a marriage was concluded
in community of property. Moreover, the two judgments were that
of the court of first instance and, subsequently, that of the Supreme
Court of Appeal in the same case. A comparison between the lower
court’s standpoint on the one hand, and that of the appeal court on
the other hand, in this matter is instructive for two reasons: first, it
ostensibly settled the legal position with regard to the (potential)
consideration of trust assets as part of a joint estate; and, secondly,
it also seemingly answered (albeit indirectly) the question of
whether the BC and RP Courts’ stance, or that of the MM Court, to
the treatment of alter ego trusts under the Matrimonial Property
Act’s accrual dispensation is to be preferred.
In T v. T145 the plaintiff (the husband) and defendant (the wife)
cohabitated for approximately four years prior to marrying, and did
so for the two years preceding their marriage in a home acquired
by a trust of which the plaintiff was a co-trustee. The parties
subsequently married in community of property, which marriage
had broken down irretrievably when the spouses separated
approximately eight years later. The plaintiff thereafter instituted
divorce proceedings against the defendant. The defendant did not
oppose the decree of divorce sought by the plaintiff, but she
instituted a counterclaim relating to the extent of the assets in the
145. T v. T [2014] ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014).
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spouses’ joint estate. The defendant averred, inter alia, that the
aforementioned trust assets, principally the matrimonial home, had
to be included in the joint estate because the plaintiff de facto
controlled the trust to amass his own wealth; moreover, the
argument was made that but for the trust, he would have acquired
the trust assets in his own name—in other words, she averred that
the trust was no more than her husband’s alter ego.146
The Court commenced its engagement with the defendant’s
averments by stating that, in order to ascertain whether the trust
“fell into the joint estate” it had to determine whether or not the
trust “is in fact the alter ego of the plaintiff and so is an asset which
is his.”147 The Court’s starting point, like that of the Court in RP v.
DP,148 appears to be premised on the supposition that a trustee’s
treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego, and the abuse of the trust
form consequent upon such treatment, occasions the trust assets to
vest in such a trustee personally and, in the instance of a marriage
in community of property, thereby to form part of the spouses’
joint estate. It must again be emphasized at this point that such a
supposition runs contrary to the pronouncement in Van Zyl v.
Kaye, highlighted earlier,149 that a trustee’s abuse of a trust through
his or her non-adherence to the fundamentals of trust
administration is in itself insufficient to sustain an averment that
the trust assets no longer vest in the trustee officially, but that those
assets vest in him or her personally. Accordingly, the Court in T v.
T, as was the case with its predecessors in BC v. CC and RP v. DP,
appears to have erred in its understanding of the consequences that
attach to a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or her alter ego. The
Court compounded its error when it referred expressly to
Badenhorst v. Badenhorst as an example of those cases in which
“properties owned by entities other than parties to the marriage
146. See the exposition on the pleadings in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
judgment: WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para. 3.
147. T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para. 28.
148. See supra Part IV. B.
149. See supra Part IV. A.
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have been held to form part of an estate.”150 However, it was
shown earlier that the appellant in Badenhorst never sought an
order depriving the trust at issue in that case of its assets, nor
indeed an order that the assets of the trust formed part of her
husband’s personal estate.151 Therefore, the Badenhorst case does
not support the finding that the T Court ascribed to it.
The Court next addressed the submission, ostensibly made by
the plaintiff, that judgments such as Badenhorst dealt with the
Divorce Act’s redistribution dispensation and, therefore, involved
the exercise of a judicial discretion; because the exercise of a
commensurate discretion was not at issue in the present matter, so
the submission proceeded, the principles laid down in Badenhorst
and corresponding judgments were inapplicable to the present
case.152 Of course, this very argument was also addressed in BC v.
CC, MM v. JM, and RP v. DP in the context of the addition of trust
asset values to the values of trustee-spouses’ personal estates under
the Matrimonial Property Act’s accrual dispensation. The Courts in
the first- and last-mentioned judgments were unconvinced by this
submission, whereas the Court in MM agreed fully with it.153
Which view would the Court in T v. T hold?
Lamont J., who handed down the judgment in T v. T, aligned
himself with the BC and RP Courts’ standpoint (although without
express reference to these cases) when he said with regard to the
judgments relied upon in the above-mentioned submission:
The flaw in the argument made to me is that in each case it
was necessary for the court to first determine what the
assets were which belonged to the party against whom the
order was to be made. This involved a decision as to how
big the estate was and what comprised the estate. Once that
investigation had been taken, a discretion was applied as to
what the financial consequences of that decision were.
There was no question of any discretion playing any role in
150.
151.
152.
153.

T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para 30.
See supra Part IV. A.
T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), paras. 31–32.
See supra Part IV. B.
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the formulation of the test to be applied in establishing
whether or not assets belonged to a particular party. The
issue in the present case is identical. The investigation to be
undertaken is whether or not the assets in the trust are the
assets of the plaintiff and hence of the joint estate.154
Lamont J.’s foregoing view certainly corresponds to that
expressed in BC v. CC and RP v. DP, namely that piercing the veil
that separates a trustee’s personal estate from the trust estate is a
function distinct from the exercise of any discretion in making a
redistribution order under Section 7 of the Divorce Act.155 As
indicated earlier,156 this view regards the making of a redistribution
order as involving two distinct functions, the first of which is a
factual determination of “which assets are [a spouse’s] personal
assets.”157 This function, being non-discretionary in nature,
applies, according to the BC and RP judgments, equally to
redistribution claims as well as accrual claims, and, in light of
Lamont J.’s ruling in T v. T, also to the inclusion of trust assets in
the determination of the extent of spouses’ joint estate. In the
result, the Court in T v. T ordered, in light of copious evidence that
the plaintiff’s co-trustee was supine to the plaintiff’s control over
the trust and that the plaintiff manipulated the trust’s affairs to give
himself unfettered access to the trust funds and assets,158 that the
spouses’ joint estate “includes the assets of the . . . Trust.”159 The
plaintiff, evidently dissatisfied with this ruling, appealed against
Lamont J.’s judgment. The appeal was heard by a full bench—five
judges—of the Supreme Court of Appeal; consequently, the appeal
judgment, under the citation WT and Others v. KT,160 constitutes,
along with the Badenhorst judgment, the most authoritative

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), paras. 33–35.
See supra Part IV. B.
Id.
RP v. DP and Others 2014 (6) SA 243 (ECP), para. 57.
T, ZAGPJHC 245 (September 19, 2014), para. 37.
Id. at para. 47.
WT and Others v. KT 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA).
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pronouncement to date on the consideration of trust assets toward
the determination of the patrimonial consequences of divorce.
The Supreme Court of Appeal made short work of what it
regarded as Lamont J.’s reliance on the Badenhorst case in the
judgment he handed down in the court of first instance. The
Supreme Court of Appeal regarded this reliance as “misdirected”
because, in the Court’s opinion, Badenhorst was decided in the
context of the discretion bestowed by Section 7(3) of the Divorce
Act toward the making of a redistribution order whereas, in the
present matter, the court, in assessing the patrimonial
consequences of the termination of a marriage in community of
property, is not vested with any commensurate discretion but is
“confined merely to directing that the assets of the joint estate be
divided in equal shares.”161 The Court then stated:
The court concerned with a marriage in community of
property . . . has no comparable discretion as envisaged in
s 7(3) of the Divorce Act to include the assets of a third
party in the joint estate. In any event, s 12 of the [Trust
Property Control] Act specifically recognizes in this
context that trust assets held by a trustee in trust, do not
form part of the personal property of such trustee as a
matter of law.162
The foregoing statement appears to situate the addition of the
asset values of alter ego trusts to the values of trustee-spouses’
personal estates exclusively within the equitable and discretionary
dispensation on the redistribution of assets contained in the
Divorce Act. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s statement
directly and pertinently excludes any possibility of adding the
assets of an alter ego trust (or their value) to a joint estate where a
marriage was concluded in community of property; a view that is
founded on the absence of any judicial discretion to such an end in
the legal rules that govern the strictly mathematical division of a
joint estate upon the termination of a marriage in community of
161. Id. at para. 35.
162. Id.
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property. It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
statement also indirectly and by analogy excludes the possibility of
adding the assets (or their value) of an alter ego trust to a trusteespouse’s personal estate for the purpose of realizing an accrual
claim where the spouses married out of community of property
subject to the accrual system. This submission is premised on the
same absence of any judicial discretion to such an end in the legal
rules that govern the strictly mathematical calculation of accrual
upon the termination of a marriage out of community of property
to which the accrual system applies. The directive, mentioned
expressly in the above dictum from WT v. KT, in Section 12 of the
Trust Property Control Act on the separateness of the trust estate in
a trustee’s hands lends further weight to this submission. In this
light, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s stance in the WT judgment
provides firm support to the judgment on accrual in MM v. JM,
and, commensurately, appears to vitiate the judgments on point in
BC v. CC and RP v. DP.
The Supreme Court of Appeal in WT also exposed the
erroneous supposition of the court of first instance regarding the
consequences that attach to a trustee’s treatment of a trust as his or
her alter ego. The Court opined that Lamont J.’s order in the court
of first instance amounted to a “transfer of the trust’s assets to the
joint estate.”163 The Supreme Court of Appeal reasoned—in
consonance with the view expressed earlier in Van Zyl v.
Kaye164—that such a “transfer” in the ownership of trust property
merely by reason of the abuse of the trust form is legally
untenable; in fact, the Court expressed doubt as to whether even
the wide discretion afforded by Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act
enables a court to effect any “transfer” of ownership in trust assets,
rather than to merely order the addition of the value of such assets

163. Id. at para. 36.
164. See supra Part IV. A.
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to that of a trustee-spouse’s personal estate when it goes behind the
trust form in the making of a redistribution order.165
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Supreme Court of
Appeal upheld the appellant’s appeal, and set aside the order of the
court of first instance on the inclusion of the trust assets in the
spouses’ joint estate.166
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The South African experience with trusts and their (possible)
role in the determination of the patrimonial consequences of
divorce bring to light many of the unforeseen challenges
occasioned by the development of a uniquely South African trust
law through the adaptation of the English-law trust to South
African law with its strong civilian legal tradition. One such
challenge relates to the conceptual clarity demanded of judicial
(and scholarly) engagement with the abuse of the trust form. The
apparent absence of such clarity in judgments such as BC v. CC,
RP v. DP and T v. T by reason of these courts’ obfuscation
regarding the difference between sham trusts and alter ego trusts
have wrought a great deal of confusion in South African
jurisprudence on claims to trust assets in divorce proceedings. The
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in WT v. KT elucidated this
matter insofar as it exposed the lack of clarity evident from these
three judgments. The Court in WT v. KT also distinguished
pertinently between the Divorce Act’s discretionary redistribution
dispensation with regard to marriages concluded subject to a
complete separation of property on the one hand, and marriages
concluded in community of property on the other hand. In the
former instance, according to the Badenhorst judgment, judicial
consideration of trust asset values to determine the patrimonial
consequences of divorce is possible, whereas in the latter instance,
165. WT, 2015 (3) SA 574 (SCA), para. 36.
166. Id. at para. 38.
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according to the WT judgment, considering trust asset values in
determining the patrimonial consequences of divorce is not
possible by reason of the absence of a judicial discretion
comparable to that afforded by the Divorce Act’s redistribution
dispensation. The latter finding extends, by implication, also to
marriages concluded out of community of property subject to the
accrual system because the accrual system is also nondiscretionary in nature.167
It must be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Appeal
made no definitive pronouncement in WT v. KT on the view
espoused in the BC, RP and T judgments that the Divorce Act’s
redistribution dispensation involves a two-tiered approach insofar
as it comprises both a non-discretionary element (determining the
extent or total value of a spouse’s estate) as well as a discretionary
element (achieving a just patrimonial outcome in the divorce
proceedings at hand); moreover, that the non-discretionary element
is transferable onto other matrimonial property regimes. Should
this view on the redistribution of assets as a segmented process
prevail in future judgments of South Africa’s highest court, it may
well (re-)open the door to the consideration of trust assets—as part
of a factual determination on the extent of a trustee-spouse’s
estate—in divorce proceedings for spouses married out of
community of property subject to the accrual system and, possibly,
even for spouses married in community of property. A close
reading of the Badenhorst judgment appears to support this view in
that the Court first addressed the question of whether the trust at
issue in casu was indeed abused, which, if answered in the
affirmative, would warrant a consideration of the trust asset value
in the determination of the extent of the defendant’s personal estate
value. The Court invoked the “but for”-test to this end. Combrinck
167. Note, however, Riley A.J.’s opinion in YB v. SB and Others NNO 2016
(1) SA 47 (WCC), that the determination of an accrual claim does not involve a
purely arithmetical calculation, but that the Matrimonial Property Act endows a
court with a certain measure of leeway as to how exactly an accrual claim must
be satisfied: paras. 34, 35.
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A.J.A., who handed down the Badenhorst judgment, said: “To
succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one
of the parties to a marriage there needs to be evidence that such
party controlled the trust and but for the trust would have acquired
and owned the assets in his own name.”168
The evidence adduced by the appellant in Badenhorst satisfied
the Court that the defendant’s abuse of the trust justified the
addition of the trust asset value to that of his personal estate. Only
thereafter did the Court proceed to determine the redistribution
amount payable by the defendant, and did so with express
reference to the equitable considerations that underpin the Divorce
Act’s redistribution dispensation. Combrinck A.J.A. said:
[I]n my judgment an equitable result will be achieved, and
recognition given to the appellant’s contribution to the
maintenance and increase of the respondent’s estate, by
ordering him to pay to the appellant the sum of R1 250 000.
This amount is arrived at by taking the total of the net asset
value of the parties’ estates and that of the trust,169
calculating a percentage which is considered just and
equitable for appellant’s contribution170 and deducting what
she already stands possessed of.171
It is submitted that this perspective on Badenhorst gives
credence to Riley A.J.’s view in YB v. SB that the consideration of
trust assets (or their values) to determine the patrimonial
consequences of divorce should be viewed broadly rather than
restrictively, or, stated differently, should be capable of application
also to matrimonial property regimes other than a complete
separation of property where the redistribution of assets is at issue.
The Judge said:

168. Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) para. 9.
169. In other words, the outcome of the inquiry under the first tier of the
aforementioned two-tiered approach.
170. In other words, the outcome of the inquiry under the second tier of the
aforementioned two-tiered approach.
171. Badenhorst, 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), para. 16.
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If I consider . . . the approach adopted by the SCA in
Badenhorst . . . it seems to me that the principles laid out in
Badenhorst as to when trust assets are to be held to form
part of a spouse’s estate are not confined to s 7(3) [of the
Divorce Act on the redistribution of assets] situations.172
The eminent South African legal scholar H. R. Hahlo observed
more than half a century ago that “when it comes to ‘trusts’ in our
law, even the most elementary propositions cannot be regarded as
settled.”173 This observation certainly rings true with regard to
South African courts’ engagement with trusts within the context of
the patrimonial consequences of divorce. Hahlo’s observation
suggests, moreover, that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
pronouncements on point in Badenhorst v. Badenhorst and WT v.
KT may not necessarily be the final word on the matter.

172. YB, 2016 (1) SA 47 (WCC), para. 49. It must be kept in mind, however,
that Riley A.J. did not consider the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in WT
v. KT in his judgment in YB v. SB.
173. H.R. Hahlo, Revocation of Trusts, 69 S. AFRICAN L.J. 348, 349 (1952).

